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Abstract—Retention regulations require timely and irrecover-
able disposal of data, a challenging task, as data and its side
effects are stored and maintained at all layers of a computing
system. Those side effects can be used as an oracle to derive the
past existence of deleted data.
Fortunately, history independence can be utilized to eliminate
such history-related oracles. HIFS [19] can provide history inde-
pendence for file storage over mechanical disk drives. However,
HIFS cannot provide history independence when deployed on top
of flash devices, as flash memory manages its own internal block
placement, which is often inherently history dependent.
In this work, we initiate research on history independent flash
devices. We design HiFlash, which achieves a strong notion of
history independence by defending against an adversary allowed
access to the flash at multiple different points in time. In
addition, we design a simple, yet history independence friendly
wear-leveling mechanism that allows HiFlash to smartly and
advantageously trade off a tunable small amount of history
leakage for a significant increase in the device’s lifetime. Our
prototype built in an actual flash device as well as extensive
simulations validate the effectiveness of HiFlash.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [25], the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act [17], and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) [51], mandate
consistent procedures for information access, processing, and
storage in health care, financial services, public corporations
and government sectors. Regulated organizations are liable
for the improper management of data even after its legal
expiration. Thus, of paramount importance are data life-cycle
regulations, that define the process of removing data once it
legally expires.
Ensuring complete irrecoverability of deleted data is dif-
ficult to achieve in modern systems. Simply overwriting data
or deploying encryption with ephemeral keys is not sufficient
since the write history itself implicitly leaves artifacts in the
layout of the resulting storage medium at all layers. The
artifacts can then be used as an oracle to answer questions
about the past existence of deleted records.
For example, the current layout of data blocks on disk is
a direct and often fully deterministic function of the sequence
and timing of previous writes to file system, database search
indexes, etc.
Questions such as “was Johns record ever in the HIV
patients dataset” can then be answered much more accurately
than guessing by simply looking at the storage layout of the
search index on disk – which will look different (e.g., with
a 30% likelihood) depending on whether John has previously
been in the data set or not.
These are the very questions that secure deletion promises
to prevent anyone (including insiders) from answering once
Johns record has been deleted.
And, unfortunately, in this case, the security of a potential
secure deletion mechanism is reduced from an apparently
“strong” 256 bit encryption with ephemeral keys to a ONE
IN THREE chance (30%) of determining whether John had
HIV!
In other words, the mere (previous) existence of deleted
records impacts the current system state implicitly at all layers.
This can be used as an oracle to derive information about the
past existence of deleted records. However, if all system layers
are designed to exhibit history independence, such implicit
history-related oracles can be made to disappear.
To enforce data life-cycle regulation requirements, it is
imperative to conceal historical information contained within
data structure states. This can be achieved by using history
independent data structures [32, 46] to organize the data. A
data structure is said to be history independent if its current
layout is not impacted by its history. By applying history
independent data structures to storage organization, an attacker,
when accessing the current layout of the storage, cannot learn
the history of the past operations.
Prior work focused on designing various history indepen-
dent data structures [20, 30, 31, 46, 54]. Little effort has been
made to tackle challenges in deploying history independent
data structures in systems. Nevertheless, achieving history
independence efficiently is hard due to the fact that current
systems are designed to heavily benefit from (data and time)
locality at all layers through heavy caching, and existing
history independent data structures completely destroy locality.
Bajaj et al. [19] designed HIFS, which is till now the sole
effort of building history independent systems. HIFS however,
can only provide history independence for file storage over
mechanical disk drives. When the underlying storage media
are changed to flash devices (e.g., SSDs), HIFS cannot provide
history independence due to the following reasons:
(a) Flash memory has a limited number of program-erase
(P/E) cycles. To avoid being worn out soon, a flash
device usually manages its own internal block placement,
which may lead to history breaches, because such “wear
leveling” placement is often inherently history dependent.
Firstly, to avoid repeatedly writing the same flash cell,
the flash device usually allocates new space for a write,
regardless if it is a new write or an over-write. These
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allocators in the commodity flash devices are designed
without considering history independence and may not
preserve history. For example, a linear allocator allocates
free space to the new writes sequentially, which directly
conflicts with history independence as the resulting layout
depends on the order of writes. Secondly, a flash device
usually performs wear leveling to balance erasures across
flash cells. This wear leveling mechanism usually requires
to periodically relocate blocks according to the write
history, which will compromise history independence.
(b) A flash device does not guarantee instantaneous deletion.
Due to its limited P/E cycles, it usually introduces deletion
latencies in order to reduce the number of block erasure
operations. In the interval between an application-issued
erase command and the time when the flash device
actually erases the block, the erased data can be recovered
by an attacker with access to the device.
Flash devices have been used extensively in mobile devices
like tablets and smart phones. Even in PCs, flash devices under
the form of SSDs have gained popularity nowadays. According
to Gartner [11], the global SSD market size had reached
$10.9 billion in 2013. Thus, providing history independence
for flash devices is of great importance, was posed as an open
problem [19] and unfortunately is still unsolved.
To provide history independence for flash devices, we need
to handle several challenges: Firstly, the allocators used in the
existing flash devices are not history independent. Designing a
history independent allocator for flash memory is challenging;
Secondly, as an essential functionality of flash controllers, wear
leveling inherently needs to interfere with history indepen-
dence, since it may often need to re-locate blocks according
to write history. Wear leveling without compromising history
is thus highly non-trivial. Thirdly, history independence may
require to perform in-place updates, which are expensive to
achieve in flash and may lead to significant write amplification,
because over-writing a small portion of data in flash may
require erasing and rewriting a large portion of data. How to
accommodate in-place updates and mitigate write amplification
is not straightforward.
In this work, we address the aforementioned challenges
and design HiFlash, the first History independence schemes for
Flash-based block devices. HiFlash is an essential component
that can be leveraged in a multi-layer approach to provide
history independence at the block device layer for SSDs,
the dominant high-end storage medium. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
(1) We initiate research on history independence for flash-
based block devices.
(2) We design HiFlash, a first solution providing history inde-
pendence for flash-based block devices. HiFlash achieves
a strong notion of history independence by defending
against an adversary allowed access to the flash at multiple
different points in time.
(3) We optimize HiFlash by mitigating write-amplification.
We design a history independence friendly wear leveling
mechanism that allows HiFlash to smartly and advanta-
geously trade off a tunable small amount of history leakage
for a significant increase in the device’s lifetime.
(4) We implement HiFlash in an actual flash device using the
OpenNFM framework.
(5) We measure the performance and impact on the underlying
device. Results are encouraging. Sequential read through-
put is within 0.9× and random read throughput is within
1.2× of baseline OpenNFM; write operation performance
is 0.2× due to write amplification, a possibly unavoidable
price to pay for history independence. Leakage quantifi-
cation and simulations seem to confirm that epoch-based
wear leveling balances a good leakage - wear leveling
effectiveness trade-off.
II. BACKGROUND
History Independence. History independence aims to prevent
historic information about the pattern of access to a data
structure from being leaked through its representation when
observed by an external party. We consider two types of
history independence [33, 46]: weak history independence
(WHI) and strong history independence (SHI). WHI allows an
adversary to observe the data structure a single time, whereas
SHI allows multiple observations over time. A data structure
implementation is said to be history independent if nothing
can be learned from the data structure’s memory representation
during these observations except for the current abstract state
of the data structure [33]. If a data structure has canonical
representations for each state, it is necessarily SHI; conversely,
SHI necessarily implies that the data structure has canonical
representations up to initial randomness [33].
To provide history independence, we can use a history
independent hash table [20, 46]. Similar to conventional hash
tables, a history independent hash table uses hash functions
to probe the table. However, the history independent hash
table uses a different collision resolution mechanism (e.g.,
priority functions [46] or Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage [20])
that can guarantee the resulting layout is independent of the
input patterns.
Flash Memory. Flash memory is a non-volatile computer
storage medium which can be electrically erased and re-
programmed. It can avoid the mechanical limitations of hard
disk drives, and has significant advantages on speed, noise,
power consumption, and reliability. There are two main types
of flash memory, NAND flash and NOR flash. In this work,
we focus on NAND flash, which is widely used in flash-
based block devices like USB sticks, solid state drives (SSDs),
MultiMediaCards (MMCs), SD cards. The NAND flash array
is usually grouped into blocks, each of which is a collection
of pages. A concrete organization of NAND flash is shown
in Figure 1. Typically, a flash block contains 32, 64, or 128
pages. Each page can be 512, 2048, or 4096 byte. Associated
with each page are a few bytes (i.e., the spare area), which
is usually 132 of the page size and can be used to store the
error-correcting code (ECC). NAND flash has several known
limitations: block erasure, memory wear, and read/program
disturb.
(a) Block erasure: Flash memory must be erased before it
can be re-written (i.e., erase-then-write). For NAND flash,
reading and programming (writing) are performed on
a page basis, but erasure can only be performed on a
block basis (a flash block is also called “erase block” or
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Fig. 1. The organization of NAND flash.
“physical block”). This however, may lead to a situation in
which the actual amount of information actually written
to the flash is a multiple of the amount of information
written by the host system. This is known as write
amplification. In general, write amplification is the ratio
between the data that ends up written to the flash and the
data written by the host. To re-write a small portion of
data in flash memory, we can have two options: 1) read all
the data from its corresponding erase block, update this
small portion of data, erase the entire block, and write
all the data back; 2) read this portion of data from its
corresponding erase block, update it, and write it to a new
block (the new block, if previously containing data, would
need to be erased, and the old data stored would need to
be relocated before an erasure can be performed). In both
cases, the data actually written to the flash memory is
larger than the data written by the host.
(b) Memory wear: NAND flash has a limited number of
program-erase (P/E) cycles before the wear begins to
deteriorate the integrity of the storage (i.e., blocks are
compromised and cannot hold data any longer). Typically,
SLC (single-level cell) NAND flash rates around 100K
P/E cycles, while MLC (multi-level cell) NAND flash
rates around 1K − 10K P/E cycles [3]. To prolong the
service life of flash memory, data should be placed such
that erasures and re-writes are distributed evenly across
it. The idea is to flatten out the access rate distribution
and ensure that no single block is much hotter than the
average and fails prematurely. This is known as wear
leveling. Conventional wear leveling relies on erasure
counts to swap blocks. Qureshi et al. [48] proposed start-
gap wear leveling, which periodically moves data around
flash blocks in a fixed pattern, and thus no need to keep
track of erasure counts.
(c) Read/Program disturb: In NAND flash, memory cells
(each cell holds a flash page) are serially connected
in a string structure, and reading/programming a cell
may cause its nearby cells in the same block to change
over time. This is known as read/program disturb.
This usually happens after hundreds of thousands
of reads/programmings. Since NAND flash usually
computes an error-correcting code (ECC) for each page,
a read/program disturb error may be corrected until
the number of its bits affected by read/program disturb
exceeds the number of bits the ECC can recover.
MTD (Memory Technology Device). Flash is often exposed
through standard abstraction layers such as MTD [9].
MTD hides many aspects specific to particular flash chips,
and provides uniform APIs to access different types of
flash memory. The uniform APIs provided by MTD are
MTD Read, MTD Write, and MTD Erase, which allow to
perform read, write, and erase over raw flash respectively.
UBI (Unsorted Block Images). UBI is usually built on top of
MTD devices. It manages logical volumes on a single physical
flash device, and implements two main functionality, wear
leveling and bad block management. UBI implements wear
leveling such that continuous writes/erasures will be spread to
all the flash blocks. In addition, UBI is aware of bad erase
blocks, and transparently handles those bad blocks.
Flash-specific File Systems and Flash Translation Layer.
To utilize a raw MTD flash device, we can either use a
flash-specific file system or expose the flash memory as a
block device: (1) A flash file system is a file system optimized
specifically for flash memory. Popular flash file systems
include JFFS2 [5], YAFFS [16], UBIFS [14], LogFS [6]. For
example, unlike conventional file systems, UBIFS always
picks different flash blocks for journal when the current
journal is filled, to avoid moving data out of the journal. (2) A
flash-based block device provides block device functionality to
an external party. This allows a conventional file system (e.g.,
ext4, FAT32) to use yet be agnostic of the underlying flash
device. Due to the specifics of flash, this naturally leads to
suboptimal utilization and device life-cycle issues. In practice,
this is achieved through a Flash Translation Layer (FTL), a
built-in controller for flash devices. FTL translates logical
block addresses to physical flash addresses, and exposes a
block device interface. Most of the commercially available
flash devices (e.g., SSDs, USB sticks, MMCs, SD cards)
have a built-in FTL. In this work, we mainly consider flash
devices which are exposed as block devices by using FTL,
e.g., SSDs. Note that Traditional FTLs [35, 39] usually adopt
a variant of log-structured writing mechanism. They may not
be able to provide history independent flash layout, as their
flash layout is usually a function of the writing history due to
“log-structured writing”.
III. MODEL
A. System Model
We consider a flash that consists of m erase blocks, each
composed of l pages (Figure 1). Using FTL (Sec. II), flash can
be exposed through a block-based access interface. In other
words, the whole device is represented as a linear array of
N “virtual blocks”, each of which may be read or written by
an external party (e.g., an operating system). We call these
“virtual blocks”, in order to differentiate them from the flash
erase blocks. Generally, we have N ∗ |virtual block| ≤ m ∗
l ∗ |flash page|, as the flash may need to reserve space for
storing system meta-data, besides storing all the data being
written to the N virtual blocks. The interface for block-based
provides the following entry-points: (let i be the virtual block
ID and 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1):
• Block Read(i, &block): read data from virtual block
i
• Block Write(i, block): write data to virtual block i
NAND flash usually has 512, 2048 or 4096 byte minimum
input/output unit size (min I/O) [8], corresponding to the
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underlying flash page sizes, and writes to NAND flash need
to be aligned to min I/O, and in increments being multiples
thereof. Thus, for efficiency, the size of a virtual block should
be a multiple of min I/O, i.e., a multiple of flash page size. To
simplify our presentation, we assume the size of a virtual
block is equal to the size of a flash page. However, our
solutions are easily extended to the case where the virtual
block size is a multiple of the flash page size. When data is
written to a virtual block, it will be stored at a flash page.
Flash Allocator. The mechanism that assigns virtual block
writes to actual flash pages is called flash allocator. Let F be
a function used by the flash allocator to compute the location
of the flash page for storing the data being written to a virtual
block. F is defined as F : {0, 1}logN → {0, 1}logm×{0, 1}logl,
where N is the total number of virtual blocks, m is the total
number of erase blocks in flash and l is the number of pages
in an erase block. F(i) = (x, y) means the data written to a
virtual block i will be stored at flash page y of erase block x.
B. Adversarial Model
We consider a one-access adversary and a multiple-access
adversary. The one-access adversary can have access to the
flash memory only once, e.g., by stealing a laptop or a smart
phone. The multiple-access adversary can have multiple access
to the flash memory, e.g., by periodically breaking into a hotel
room and obtaining a “memory dump” of the targeted flash
device. Both adversaries aim to illegitimately derive sensitive
information which is not available through a “legitimate”
interface, including the order of past operation sequence (e.g.,
the order in which ballots were cast in a voting machine [43]),
the evidence of past existence of delete data [18], etc.
IV. SCENARIOS
In the following, we provide scenarios showing that com-
modity SSDs may not provide history independence, and the
adversary may take advantage of this to either infer the past
existence of deleted data, or compromise the order of past
operation sequences. Note that commodity SSDs usually prefer
a log-structured writing technique [10], by which data and
metadata are written sequentially to pages of a flash block.
Let A, B, C and D be the data written to flash.
Scenario 1: inferring the previous existence of deleted
data. As shown in Figure 2(a), A, B and C are written to
flash in step 1. In step 2, to securely delete B (e.g., after a
TRIM operation [13] is issued), the corresponding page can
be cleared by using zero overwriting [52] or scrubbing [55]. In
step 3, D is written. As flash memory must be erased before
it can be re-written (Sec. II), D needs to be written to a new
page, rather than the old page storing B previously. By having
access to the flash layout, an adversary may be able to tell there
was a deleted record stored between A and C. As B may be
correlated to both A and C, the adversary may infer more
information about the deleted record B.
Scenario 2: compromising the order of past operation
sequences. As shown in Figure 2(b), for three different write
sequences, the resulting layouts in flash are different. By
having access to the flash layout, an adversary may be able to
tell which write sequence leads to a certain state. For example,
if the adversary finds out the current flash layout is of case 2,
it will know that the write sequence was not “A, B, C” or
“C, A, B”, very likely “B, C, A”. If A, B and C are voting
records, the adversary may know the order in which people
voted, leading to compromise of voter privacy [43].
(a) The adversary may infer the previous existence of deleted data
(b) The adversary may compromise voter privacy
Fig. 2. Motivating scenarios.
V. HiFlash
In this section, we present HiFlash, a collection of history
independent schemes and associated implementations for flash-
based block devices.
A. Key Insights
Multiple key insights lead to our HiFlash designs.
Using a history independent data structure without col-
lision resolution. Seemingly, we can directly use a history
independent hash table (Sec. II) when designing the flash
allocator. This would provide history independence yet would
be impractical, for a number of reasons. The performance of
a hash table will degrade significantly when its load factor
is large [19], as collisions will become frequent, leading to
frequent re-locations of data. This will be exacerbated in flash
due to its erase-then-write requirement (Sec. II). In our setting
(Sec. III-A), a hash table seems to be unnecessary. Originally
designed to map a key from a large domain to a value stored
in a small array, the hash table usually has additional overhead
for collision resolution. A flash allocator maps the keys from a
small domain (i.e., [0, N −1], where N is the total number of
virtual blocks) to a value stored in a small array, which does
not require using a hash table and may avoid the overhead of
collision resolution.
4
Temporal locality can mitigate write amplification. A vast
majority of workloads of interest exhibit a certain temporal
locality property as our experiments and others have shown
[34, 40]. Recently written blocks are likely to be written again
in the near future. However, in flash memory, performing an
in-place update on a page requires to first erase its entire
encompassing erase block. This may lead to significant write
amplification if the other pages of this block are not empty. We
may be able to mitigate this by caching multiple subsequent
writes and performing them together, as the cached writes
may target only a few different erase blocks, and by waiting,
we reduce the number of total block erasures necessary per
incoming write.
Wear leveling that balances a leakage – wear leveling effec-
tiveness trade-off. Wear leveling is of paramount importance
for flash memory as each flash cell usually features a limited
number of program-erase cycles (Sec. II). The rationale of
wear leveling is to move hot data around, such that writes
and erasures can be distributed evenly among flash cells,
prolonging the service life of flash memory. However, to
identify hot data, conventional wear leveling techniques [23]
usually need to keep track of the entire write history, which
may lead to significant history leakage. Our design used a
controlled, significantly smaller amount of historical informa-
tion to achieve effective wear leveling, achieving an acceptable
leakage – wear leveling effectiveness trade-off.
B. HiFlash Schemes
In the following, we first present a basic HiFlash scheme,
which mitigates write amplification by leveraging the temporal
locality of its input access patterns. We then present an
improved HiFlash scheme, which adds an optimized history
independence friendly wear leveling mechanism that can trade
off a tunable small amount of history leakage for a significant
increase in the device’s lifetime.
1) A Basic HiFlash Scheme: This basic scheme is built
around a bijective mapping between virtual block IDs and flash
pages. A potential flash allocator for this setting is illustrated
in Figure 3, in which F (Sec. III-A) is constructed around
a simple permutation Π on the set of virtual block IDs as
follows: F (i) = (Π(i)/l, Π(i%l)), where i is the virtual block
ID.
Fig. 3. A history independent flash allocator.
Mitigating write amplification. When an external party over-
writes a virtual block on the block device, our history inde-
pendent flash allocator needs to perform an in-place update
over the corresponding flash page. This may cause write
amplification (Sec. II) because, it may require an erase of
the corresponding erase block, which may lead to multiple
additional page reads/writes to accommodate any of its non-
empty pages.
One idea to mitigate this may be to increase the size
of the virtual block. At one extreme, the virtual block size
can be equal to the size of an erase block, in which case,
seemingly, write amplification resulted from in-place updates
will be completely eliminated. However, a number of represen-
tative workload access pattern data sets suggest that in many
scenarios, most of the writes performed on a block device are
only a few KBs in size (see Sec. VII-B). Thus, choosing the
virtual block as large as an erase block may end up being
extremely inefficient in practice and in fact lead to an even
higher overall device degradation over time.
Another idea would be to use the temporal locality of
incoming writes (Sec. V-A). Firstly, data being written to
adjacent virtual blocks will be more likely stored in the same
erase block. We call this new property locality preservation. A
locality-preserving history independent flash allocator is shown
in Figure 4, F(i) = (x, y), where x = Π(i)/l, y = Π(i)%l
and Π(i) = i. The locality-preserving history independent flash
allocator is also a bijective mapping between virtual block IDs
and flash pages.
Secondly, a certain number of writes can be cached and
performed together, to preserve a certain degree of locality in
flash. The number of erasures required will be reduced as the
cached writes will necessarily belong to fewer different erase
blocks.
One security concern here is the history leakage associ-
ated with cached writes, which may now be available to an
adversary getting access to the device before the writes have
been flushed. Using a history independent data structure [28]
to organize the cached writes helps mitigate the leakage, but
unavoidably, the attacker will know that the writes being
cached are recent.
Fig. 4. A locality-preserving history independent flash allocator.
2) An Improved HiFlash Scheme: The basic HiFlash
scheme uses a history independent flash allocator, bijectively
mapping virtual blocks to flash pages. However, conventional
file systems (e.g., FAT, NTFS and ext2) were originally de-
signed for magnetic disks, and may re-write many of their
data structures repeatedly to the same area of a block device.
The basic HiFlash scheme does nothing to handle any such
distribution unevenness – some flash regions will end up sig-
nificantly “hotter” than others and risk early wear and failure.
This is confirmed by real workload data (see Sec. VII-B). To
prevent premature device demise, we need to provide wear
leveling.
At its core, any wear leveling mechanism basically swaps
the location of hot and cold pages in the hope of “evening
out” overall wear. Naturally, swapping itself features a write
overhead and thus needs to be performed smartly lest it defeats
the very purpose it was designed for. Conventional global
wear leveling [23, 24] usually keeps track of lifetime block
or page “erasure counts”, to decide which blocks or pages to
swap and where to place them. This can help achieve optimal
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wear leveling [23]. However, lifetime erasure counts may leak
an unacceptable amount of history and result in a history-
dependent layout.
Strawman solution: random wear leveling. To start mit-
igating this issue, we first propose a simple wear leveling
solution without the above leaks: periodically choose a number
of blocks uniformly at random and swap them. We call this
solution random wear leveling. The resulting layout is a result
of both the flash allocator and the random wear leveling, but
independent of the input patterns (i.e., history independence
can be achieved), because: 1) the flash allocator is history
independent (Sec. V-B1), and the layout resulted from it is
always independent of the input patterns; 2) random wear
leveling swaps blocks without relying on any other information
associated with input patterns. The effectiveness of random
wear leveling should be close to the start-gap wear leveling
(Sec. II), as each block has an equal probability to be swapped.
SLC NAND flash is typically rated at about 100K P/E
cycles [3]), and incorporating random wear leveling may
be acceptable, as each block may likely be swapped before
wearing out. However, modern MLC only has approximately
1K-10K P/E cycles [3]), thus incorporating random wear
leveling may be problematic, as a block may never be swapped
before it gets worn out.
Wear leveling based on epoch counts. It is unclear however
whether we can do better than random wear leveling without
tracking at least some history. Thus, instead of optimal wear
leveling and long-term erasure counts that may leak too much
information, we propose an epoch-based mechanism in which
only a controllable amount of erasure count information is
kept for a limited amount of time (the epoch). Wear leveling
decisions are then only based on this limited information.
Epochs are measured in time or number of transactions and
may be adjusted to minimize a meaningful measure of history
leak while maximizing the uniformity of the resulting wear
layout and thus the device lifetime. In effect, what we are
proposing is to explore the impact of reducing the amount
of tracked history on the wear leveling effectiveness, and
eventually balance a leakage - wear leveling effectiveness
trade-off.
The hope is that even with a controlled, significantly
smaller amount of historical information, acceptably effective
wear leveling can still be achieved. We call this wear leveling
solution epoch wear leveling. At the end of an epoch, the
erasure counts will be re-set to 0, such that history leakage is
controlled. Note that, when compared to global wear leveling,
epoch wear leveling seems to be unavoidably less effective.
However, the additional wear information provides significant
hope that it can perform significantly better than random wear
leveling.
Handling the mappings between logical blocks and physical
blocks. We use “MAP I” to denote the map between logical
blocks and physical pages. We can store MAP I in flash.
However, updating MAP I will be expensive since flash is not
update-friendly. A better solution is to store MAP I in RAM, as
most flash devices are equipped with a certain amount of built-
in RAM. For example, Jasmine OpenSSD Platform has 64GB
flash and 64MB DRAM [4], Cosmos OpenSSD Platform can
support up to 512GB flash and has 1GB DRAM [1], and LPC-
H3131 has 500MB flash and 32MB DRAM [7]. In practice, the
MAP I table is usually small in size, and is thus possible to be
kept in RAM. For example, for a 64GB flash with 4KB page
size and 128KB block size, MAP I is approximately 1.2MB
in size. Storing MAP I in RAM will be advantageous, since
RAM is update friendly. However, data stored in RAM will
be vulnerable to system failures, due to the volatile nature of
RAM and may be lost upon unexpected accidental events such
as power failure.
To be able to recover MAP I after system failures, we also
embed MAP I data in erase blocks. We store the logical block
ID in a header of each flash block. When the flash device is
gracefully turned off, MAP I is committed to flash. In the case
of a power failure, the lack of this commit will be noticed upon
reboot and MAP I can be reconstructed by reading the headers
of the blocks in flash. For a 64GB flash device with 4KB page
size and 128KB block size, this requires to read 2GB data,
which can be done in 10 seconds at a 200MB/s throughput.
A simple commit flag-based mechanism can be used for
failure detection. A flash-stored flag is initially reset to 0. When
the flash device boots successfully, the flag will be set to 1.
When the flash device is powered off normally, the flag will
be re-set to 0. The flag is maintained smartly in one special
erase block which can also change over time for wear leveling
– after writing the address of its future location in its previous
block. A number of replicas can also be maintained similar to
superblock copies in file systems.
Handling epoch counts. Physical block erase counts for the
current epoch (“epoch counts”) are also maintained in a table
similar to MAP I. The epoch counts table is small and can
be stored in RAM. No power failure mechanism will be
implemented under the assumption that power failures are
rare and that keeping extremely accurate epoch counts is not
critical. Upon system failures, we can simply discard the old
set of epoch counts.
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Security Analysis
The basic HiFlash scheme can achieve SHI. The history
independent flash allocator (Sec. V-B1) relies on a bijective
mapping between virtual block IDs and flash pages, which
guarantees that (i) data being written to the same virtual block
will always be assigned to the same flash page; (ii) data being
written to two different virtual blocks will always be assigned
to two different flash pages. Thus, the resulting layout of flash
memory is always canonical, and canonical representations can
achieve SHI (Sec. II), and can defend against a multiple-access
adversary.
The improved HiFlash scheme with random wear leveling
can achieve WHI. In the improved HiFlash scheme with
random wear leveling, the layout is a result of both the flash
allocator and the random wear leveling, but fully independent
of the input patterns (Sec. V-B2). Thus, the scheme can provide
at least weak history independence. Since the resulting layout
is randomized by random wear leveling, two conclusions can
be reached: (i) The scheme cannot provide SHI, as SHI
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requires canonical layout up to the initial randomness (Sec. II);
(ii) The scheme can achieve WHI (i.e., can defend against
the one-access adversary), as random wear leveling swaps
a random (uniformly random) subset of blocks during each
epoch.
Quantify the leakage in the improved HiFlash scheme with
epoch wear leveling. During epoch j, by accessing the epoch
counts, the adversary can identify an operation sequence that
led to current state (from initial randomness) with a probability
no larger than (
m+c−1
m−1 )
mcj (Appendix A), where m is the total
number of erase blocks in flash, and c is the total number of
erase operations in an epoch. This probability is very small in
practice, e.g., for m = 1000, c = 10, j = 2, it is approximately
10−30. Thus, accessing the epoch counts provides only a small,
upper-bound advantage to the adversary in identifying the
exact operation sequence and input patterns that lead to the
current state.
It is important however to note that this is not entirely
accurate since the inability of the adversary to identify the
exact sequence does not necessarily imply an inability to find
out something else about the sequence. It is the subject of
future work to further understand this.
B. Discussion
Bad block management. A flash device will degrade over
time and develop bad blocks. Thus, we need to keep track of
bad blocks and avoid using them in the future. This usually
requires using a table to store the IDs of bad blocks. As this bad
block table is usually small, it can be stored in RAM. When
the flash device is powered off normally, the bad block table
will be committed to flash. When a power failure happens, the
lack of this commit (Sec. V-B2) will be noticed upon reboot
and the bad block table can be reconstructed by taking a pass
of the flash to check each block. Please note that bad blocks
necessarily leak some historical information (i.e., that they
were written often) – but since they involve hardware failure
it is unclear how to hide this information from an adversary
with access to the device.
TRIM and history independence. An ATA TRIM com-
mand [13] allows an external party to inform an SSD which
blocks of data are no longer in use and can be wiped internally.
Flash devices like MMC and SD provide similar functionality
to the ATA TRIM [13]. Conventional file systems usually
handle delete operations by flagging the deleted blocks as
“unused”. Thus, the underlying storage media would not
know which sectors/pages can be considered as free space.
However, it would be advantageous to notify the SSD when
the files are deleted as the SSD will know which pages
are invalid, and not to preserve the content on those pages
during block erasures, wear leveling, etc. The TRIM command
is designed for this notification purpose. Upon receiving a
TRIM command, commodity SSDs may not wipe the invalid
pages [15] immediately. This however, may conflict with
history independence, as the deleted data may remain in flash.
History independence requires reclaiming the invalid pages
immediately, which requires performing a block erasure for
each invalid page in the worse case. One optimization could
be to cache TRIM commands, and perform them together
(Sec. V-B1), as deletions in block devices also exhibit certain
degree of locality.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATIONS
A. Implementation
We implemented HiFlash in an actual flash device using
OpenNFM [10], an open source NAND flash controller frame-
work. We extensively modified the OpenNFM code base, and
built a History independent NAND Flash Manager (HiNFM).
To be consistent with OpenNFM framework, we view the
flash memory as two layers, a logical layer and a physical
layer. The flash allocator can assign virtual block writes to the
logical layer, while bad block management and wear leveling
are independently performed between the logical and physical
layer. Logical layer erase blocks are called logical erase blocks
(LEB), while physical layer erase blocks are called physical
erase blocks (PEB). An LEB can be viewed as a special erase
block (logically exists), which has an underlying PEB, and
has the following properties: 1) It will not get corrupted, as
its underlying PEB will be changed to a new one if the old
one is corrupted. MAP I is used to keep track of mappings
between LEBs and PEBs. 2) It does not need to worry about
wear, as its underlying PEB will be swapped by wear leveling.
1) HiNFM Design: Similar to OpenNFM, we adopt an
architecture consisting of three layers: FTL, UBI and MTD
(Figure 5). FTL mainly handles mappings between virtual
blocks and LEB pages. FTL provides a uniform block device
interface to an external party (Sec. III-A). UBI mainly takes
care of wear leveling and bad block management. It handles
mappings between LEBs and PEBs, such that: 1) it updates
the mappings between LEBs and PEBs in the process of wear
leveling; 2) it can re-map an LEB to a new good PEB if the
old PEB is corrupted (i.e., bad block management). UBI allows
the FTL to read/write flash memory without worrying about
bad blocks and wear. MTD provides a raw flash abstraction. It
allows the UBI to read, write and erase raw flash without being
bothered by physical characteristics of different flash chips.
Fig. 5. HiNFM layers.
HiNFM history independence features are incorporated into
the UBI and FTL layer.
MTD. MTD is built on top of raw flash, and mainly provides
three uniform APIs to allow the UBI to read, write and erase
raw flash:
• MTD Read(PEB index, offset, &data): read data
from a PEB page identified by PEB index and offset
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• MTD Write(PEB index, offset, data): write data to a
PEB page identified by PEB index and offset
• MTD Erase(PEB index): erase the PEB identified by
PEB index
UBI. UBI is built on top of MTD, and uses the APIs provided
by MTD to read/write PEB pages or erase PEB blocks. UBI
simply views the flash as a collection of PEBs without being
bothered by the underlying flash specifications. Our design
for UBI is shown in Figure 6. We reserve a certain number
of PEBs as free blocks (e.g., 2%), which will be used for
replacing bad blocks. We also reserve a small number of PEBs
(e.g., 0.1%) for storing the bad block table (Sec. VI-B) and
MAP I (Sec. V-B2). We call these PEBs “anchor blocks”.
As the bad block table and MAP I are both small in size,
they can be stored and updated in RAM. They will only be
stored in the anchor blocks when the flash device is shut down
normally, which will not add too much wear to the anchor
blocks. However, to avoid being worn out, the anchor blocks
will be periodically swapped with a new set of PEBs. UBI
mainly provides three uniform APIs to allow FTL to read/write
LEB pages or erase an LEB:
• UBI Read(LEB index, offset, &data): read data from
an LEB page identified by LEB index and offset
• UBI Write(LEB index, offset, data): write data to an
LEB page identified by LEB index and offset
• UBI Erase(LEB index): erase an LEB identified by
LEB index, which will cause an erasure over the
corresponding PEB
Fig. 6. UBI remapping in HiNFM.
FTL. FTL is built on top of UBI, and uses the APIs provided
by UBI to read/write LEB pages or erase LEBs. FTL simply
views the flash as a collection of LEBs, without having to
handle bad blocks and wear leveling. The HiFlash FTL design
reserves a certain number of LEBs for journal blocks (e.g.,
1), and the remaining LEBs are used as regular data blocks.
Note that LEBs will never wear out as the underlying UBI will
take care of wear leveling (i.e., if an LEB generates too much
wear to the corresponding PEB, it will be relocated to another
PEB by wear leveling). The flash allocator (Sec. V-B1) assigns
virtual block writes to LEB pages. The writes are first cached
in the journal blocks. When the journal blocks are filled, we
will perform all the writes together. The journal LEBs are then
erased and re-used.
2) Implementation and Experimental Results: We ported
HiNFM to LPC-H3131 [7], a development board equipped
with 180 MHz ARM microcontroller, 500MB NAND flash and
32 MB SDRAM. The flash has 128-KB blocks and 2KB pages
– each erase block is composed of 64 pages. The resulting
board can be used as a history independent USB 2.0 flash
drive. As LPC-H3131 has approximately 4000 erase blocks in
its NAND flash, the MAP I table will be approximately 6KB
in size (MAP I will contain 4000 mappings, each of which
can be represented by 12 bits). Similarly, the bad block table
will be also approximately 6KB in size.
We benchmarked HiNFM using fio [2] (when running fio,
we used non-buffered io), running in a host computer with
8 Intel i7 CPUs at 1.60GHz, 10GB RAM and Windows 8
Pro 64-bit. For comparison, we also benchmarked OpenNFM.
As the latest version of OpenNFM does not incorporate wear
leveling, we added global wear leveling support to it as well
as some other optimizations (e.g., storing the bad block table
in RAM), and used this modified version of OpenNFM for
comparison.
Implementation and deployment issues. We note that LPC-
H3131 is not compatible with USB 3.0. We also observed that
the MTD Check function in the OpenNFM framework is not
reliable, and cannot guarantee always returning a correct result.
Thus, using this function to check whether a block is bad will
not be reliable.
Experimental results. For both HiNFM and OpenNFM, we
choose the same wear leveling epoch (e.g., 100 erase opera-
tions), and the same number of blocks being swapped (e.g., 1)
during each epoch. In HiNFM, to mitigate write amplification,
we did the following according to Sec. V-B1: 1) we increase
the virtual block size; 2) we used 1 journal block (which is
an LEB block an will not wear out as UBI takes care of wear
leveling) to cache writes.
Benchmarking results for both HiNFM and OpenNFM are
shown in Figure 7. We have several observations:
(a) The sequential read throughput of HiNFM is close to
that of OpenNFM (0.9×, as shown in Figure 7(a)). Ran-
dom read of HiNFM has approximately 1.2× throughput
compared to OpenNFM (Figure 7(a)). This is because,
HiNFM FTL can efficiently locate an LEB page by
simply performing the F function (Sec. III-A) over the
virtual block ID. In contrast, OpenNFM FTL searches
through a flash-stored map table keeping track of the
mappings between virtual block IDs and LEB pages –
this is necessary since virtual block IDs and LEB pages
do not have a fixed relation in OpenNFM. The map is
stored in flash and only a small portion is cached in
RAM, as it keeps track of pages and will be large in
size. However, sequential read in OpenNFM is fast as the
cached mappings preserve locality of virtual blocks.
(b) For sequential write of HiNFM, we observed approxi-
mately 4× degradation in throughput compared to Open-
NFM (Figure 7(b)-7(d)). For random write of HiNFM,
we observed more degradation in throughput, 5× when
the virtual block size is increased to 64KB (Figure 7(d)).
The write performance degradation is mainly due to write
amplification. OpenNFM does not provide history inde-
pendence and thus can always write the data to new empty
pages, resulting in significantly lower write amplification.
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For HiNFM however, write amplification may be the
unavoidable price to pay because we need to perform
in-place update to achieve history independence, and in-
place update is expensive for flash memory. Utilizing
temporal locality and increasing the virtual block size
can help to mitigate write amplification, but unfortunately
cannot eliminate it. Note that, when the virtual block size
is small, sequential write in HiNFM seems to be much
faster than random write (Figure 7(b)). This is because,
caching writes can help improve the sequential write per-
formance as writes performed sequentially usually exhibit
good locality. However, writes performed randomly usu-
ally do not exhibit locality due to randomness. Increasing
virtual block size can help improve the performance of
random write (Figure 7(b)-7(d)), as it can help reduce
the gap between the unit of an in-place update and the
unit of an erasure (i.e., one erase block), mitigating write
amplification (Sec. II).
B. Simulations
To fine-tune our design we performed extensive simulations
using real-life workloads. We evaluated the effectiveness of
utilizing temporal locality to mitigate write amplification; we
measured the distribution of block erasures over flash when
incorporating different wear leveling mechanisms into HiFlash.
Each erase block consists of 64 4-KB pages.
We used three representative workloads (Table I), selected
from the 1-week block I/O traces of enterprise servers at
Microsoft Research Cambridge [47]. Workload data (Table I
shows that small-sized (about 4KB) writes dominate.
Workload name web 1 wdev 0 hm 0
Workload type web/SQLserver
test web
server
monitoring
server
# of total writes 73,833 913,732 4,060,610
Workload category small size medium size large size
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OUR WORKLOADS: WE CHOOSE A SMALL-SIZE, A
MEDIUM-SIZE AND A LARGE-SIZE WORKLOAD, RESPECTIVELY.
web 1 wdev 0 hm 0
0.5KB 16.7% 4.7% 14.1%
4KB 59.6% 61.8% 48.4%
8KB 7.6% 6.6% 10.7%
16KB 1.0% 11.1% 5.9%
Others 15.1% 15.8% 20.9%
TABLE II
WRITE SIZES FOR DIFFERENT WORKLOADS.
Mitigating write amplification. We simulated the effective-
ness of utilizing temporal locality to mitigate write amplifica-
tion. For different workloads, we measured the total number
of writes and erasures performed on the flash by varying
the number of cached writes from 0 to 256. The simulation
results are shown in Figure 8(a) and 8(b). We observed that,
(i) Compared to no caching, the total number of writes and
erasures can be reduced by approximately an order of mag-
nitude by caching 64 writes, and (ii) overall, as expected, the
total number of writes and erasures decreases with increasing
number of cached writes. This justifies the effectiveness of
using temporal locality to mitigate write amplification for real
workloads.
Evaluating different wear leveling mechanisms. In this
simulation, we incorporated different wear leveling solutions
into HiFlash, and evaluated how they affect the distribution
of block erasures. A wear leveling mechanism is said to be
effective if the erasures are distributed evenly across flash
blocks. We evaluated the effectiveness by relying on the
maximum erasure count in a distribution. We perform two sets
of simulations:
• We fix the epoch size as 100 erase operations, and
swap 10 erase blocks at the end of each epoch.
Simulation results for various workloads are shown
in Figure 9 (no wear leveling), Figure 10 (random
wear leveling), Figure 11 (epoch wear leveling) and
Figure 12 (global wear leveling [23]).
• We vary the epoch size (120, 140, 160 and 180 erase
operations) to study how epoch size will influence
the distribution of block erasures when incorporating
epoch wear leveling. Correspondingly, we swap 12,
14, 16 and 18 blocks at the end of each epoch
respectively. This can ensure that the overhead brought
by swapping blocks remains the same for the afore-
mentioned four cases. Simulation results for workload
“hm 0” are shown in Figure 13 (as we have similar
observations for different workloads, we only show the
set of simulation results for the large-size workload).
We note several observations: (i) Lack of wear leveling causes
significant write unevenness (Figure 9), as the basic HiFlash
scheme bijectively maps virtual blocks to flash pages, passing
the write unevenness on the block device to flash. (ii) Com-
pared to no wear leveling, random wear leveling can improve
the effectiveness by approximately an order of magnitude
(Figure 10). (iii) Compared to random wear leveling, epoch
wear leveling is approximately an order of magnitude more
effective (Figure 11). However, its effectiveness is only about
50% of that of full-fledged global wear leveling (Figure 12).
Epoch wear leveling seems to have the potential to properly
balance a leakage - wear leveling effectiveness trade-off. (iv)
Increasing epoch size will improve the effectiveness of epoch
wear leveling (Figure 13). This is because: when increasing
the epoch size, more history information can be relied on to
balance wear at the end of each epoch. Note that increasing
epoch size will lead to more leakage in each epoch, as the
adversary can learn the epoch counts when having access to
the flash (Sec. V-B2).
VIII. RELATED WORK
History Independence. Micciancio et al. [42] initiated the
research of history independence. They designed an oblivious
2-3 tree with the property that the topology of the tree does not
leak the sequence of operations that led to it. Several choices
(e.g., whether a non-leaf node will have two or three child
nodes is randomized, re-balancing during local modifications)
are randomized. This enables the tree to have a probability
distribution of nodes that is independent of the sequence of
operations. Naor et al. [46] were the first to introduce the
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(a) Read (b) Write: virtual block size = 16KB
(c) Write: virtual block size = 32KB (d) Write: virtual block size = 64KB
Fig. 7. Read/Write throughput of OpenNFM and HiNFM: SR - sequential read, RR - random read, SW - sequential write, RW - random write.
(a) Page writes (b) Erasures
Fig. 8. Mitigating write amplification by caching multiple writes: simulation results based on real workloads.
notions of weak and strong history independence (WHI and
SHI). They designed a SHI hash table that supports search
and insert operations. The hash table construction is similar to
linear probing [41] except for the collision resolution. Golovin
et al. [20, 29] designed a history independent hash table
that can support search, insert and delete operations, based
on the stable matching property of the Gale-Shapley Stable
Marriage [27] algorithm. Some other history independent data
structures have been designed, including Cuckoo Hashing [45],
B-Treaps [30], B-SkipList [31], R-Trees [54].
Hartline et al. [32, 33] showed that strong history indepen-
dence necessarily implies that the data structure has canonical
representations up to initial randomness. Buchbinder et al. [21]
obtained the first time complexity separation between the weak
and the strong notions of history independent data structures
(e.g., for both heap and queue).
History independence on write once storage. Molnar et
al. [43] designed history independence schemes for write-once
storage, e.g., in voting machines, such that the contents of
the voting record will not reveal the order in which ballots
were cast. They proposed multiple candidate constructions
for how to organize storage of write-in votes. The copyover
list construction requires O(n2) space to store n keys. The
single pooled lexicographic chain table requires O(nlog2n)
space. The most space-efficient solution is the single pooled
random placement table, in which new elements are inserted at
random locations on the write-once storage. Although simple
and space-efficient, the random approach requires random bits
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(a) web 1 (b) wdev 0 (c) hm 0
Fig. 9. The distribution of block erasures for various workloads in the basic HiFlash: no wear leveling.
(a) web 1 (b) wdev 0 (c) hm 0
Fig. 10. The distribution of block erasures for various workloads in the improved HiFlash: using random wear leveling; the epoch size is 100 erase operations.
(a) web 1 (b) wdev 0 (c) hm 0
Fig. 11. The distribution of block erasures for various workloads in the improved HiFlash: using epoch wear leveling; epoch size is 100 erase operations.
to be hidden from the adversary. Moran et al. [44] proposed a
solution that requires O(n · polylog(N)) space, to store a set
of at most n keys from a large universe of size N .
Secure deletion on solid state drives. Sun et al. [52] identified
zero overwriting and block cleaning, as techniques to securely
delete data on flash storage. They also proposed a hybrid
scheme that adaptively applies the more efficient solution. Lee
et al. [37, 38] proposed an encryption-based secure deletion
scheme for YAFFS, a log-structured file system. The current
and the previous keys of a file are forced to be stored in the
same block of the flash memory. Thus, a file can be deleted by
a single block erase. Lee et al. [36] extended this solution with
standard data sanitization operations on the key containing
blocks.
Reardon et al. [50] introduced three techniques for secure
deletion in YAFFS: purging and ballooning at the user-level,
and zero overwriting at the kernel level. In [49], they intro-
duced the Data Node Encrypted File System (DNEFS), which
can achieve secure deletion against a computationally-bounded
single access adversary. DNEFS encrypts each data node with
a different key and collocates the keys in a key storage area
on the flash. They instantiated DNEFS for UBIFS, and built
UBIFSec, which can achieve fine-grained deletion and provide
a guaranteed upper bound on deletion latency.
Swanson et al. [53] combined encryption and erasure based
methods to achieve secure deletion. The combination can
provide almost instant erasure along with verifiability. By
observing that programming individual pages is possible, Wei
et al. [55] proposed to use scrubbing to efficiently sanitize flash
pages. They presented and evaluated three different scrubbing
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(a) web 1 (b) wdev 0 (c) hm 0
Fig. 12. The distribution of block erasures for various workloads: using global wear leveling; the epoch size is 100 erase operations.
(a) epoch size = 120 erase operations (swap 12 blocks at the
end of each epoch)
(b) epoch size = 140 erase operations (swap 14 blocks at the
end of each epoch)
(c) epoch size = 160 erase operations (swap 16 blocks at the
end of each epoch)
(d) epoch size = 180 erase operations (swap 18 blocks at the
end of each epoch)
Fig. 13. The distribution of block erasures for epoch wear leveling under different epoch sizes.
methods that make different trade-offs between performance
and security.
Diesburg et al. [26] proposed TrueErase, a framework
that deletes data and metadata upon user request. TrueErase
correctly propagated secure deletion information all the way
from the user to the storage. To securely delete a page from
a flash block, they copy other in-use pages from the current
flash block to other areas, and mark those pages as unused in
the block. The page to be deleted is then marked invalid, and
the current flash block can be cleared via a block erasure.
To securely remove data from flash, the aforementioned
studies used encryption [36]–[38, 49], block erasure [26, 52,
53] or scrubbing [52, 55]. However, none of them can provide
history independent flash layout. In all of them, the write
history of the data would implicitly leave artifacts in the layout
of flash, which may be used as an oracle by the attacker
to infer the past existence of deleted data. HiFlash however,
can eliminate these history-related oracles from flash layout,
making it impossible to recover the deleted data from flash
devices.
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Other related work. Caching is pervasively used in systems
(e.g., Kells [22]) to improve performance. Caching in HiFlash
is slightly different in that it does not rely on volatile RAM
for caching, to mitigate power failure issues. Instead, we use
the non-volatile flash for caching (Sec. VII-A2). The writes to
flash will be first stored in journal blocks sequentially. After
a certain number of writes are accumulated, the writes are
performed to the actual flash locations (the total number of
erasures required is expected to be reduced as the cached writes
will belong to fewer different erase blocks).
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design HiFlash, a first history indepen-
dent flash device. HiFlash achieves history independence by
building around a bijective mapping between virtual block
IDs and flash pages, optimizing write amplification by uti-
lizing temporal locality, and a history independence friendly
wear leveling mechanism that allows HiFlash to smartly and
advantageously trade off a tunable small amount of history
leakage for a significant increase in the device’s lifetime. A
prototype implemented in an actual flash device and extensive
simulations validate the effectiveness of HiFlash.
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APPENDIX
Assume the flash consists of m erase blocks. An epoch
is chosen as c erase operations. During epoch j (where j ≥
1), the adversary accesses the flash device, and obtains the
entire epoch counts. We aim to quantify the probability that the
adversary can learn the operation sequence which led to current
layout (from the initial randomness). We use Pj to denote this
probability. To simplify this problem, we assume the writes
are performed on erase blocks. Equivalently, an epoch has c
writes. In the following, we start with some basic cases, and
then generalize the results.
Case 1: m = 2, c = 2. We use A and B to identify the two
erase blocks respectively. The adversary accesses the flash at
the end of epoch j, and tries to derive the write sequence
starting from the initial randomness (i.e., the beginning of
epoch 1).
(1) If the adversary accesses the flash at the end of epoch 1:
The possible distributions of epoch counts on block A and
B are (2, 0), (1, 1), (0, 2). The adversary may observe one of
these three distributions, and may identify the write sequence
as follows:
(2, 0): the write sequence can only be A, A;
(0, 2): the write sequence can only be B, B;
(1, 1): the write sequence can be either A, B or B, A.
Thus, by observing the epoch counts at the end of epoch
1, P1 will be 14 × 1 + 14 × 1 + 12 × 12 = 34 = 3(22)1 .
(2) If the adversary accesses the flash at the end of epoch 2:
As the adversary has no knowledge about epoch 1, it can
only guess the write sequence in epoch 1. Each possible write
sequence in epoch 1 has an equal probability of 14 , as there
are 4 possible write sequences. Thus, P2 can be calculated as
1
4 × ( 14 × 1×+ 14 × 1 + 12 × 12 ) = 342 = 3(22)2 .
(3) If the adversary accesses the flash at the end of epoch j:
We simply generalize Pj as 34j =
3
(22)j , in which 3 is the
total number of distributions of epoch counts.
Case 2: m=3, c=2. We use A, B and C to identify the
3 erase blocks respectively. Similarly, the adversary accesses
the flash at the end of epoch j, and tries to derive the write
sequence starting from the initial randomness.
(1) If the adversary accesses the flash at the end of epoch 1:
The possible distributions of epoch counts on these three
erase blocks are (2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 2), (1, 1, 0), (1,
0, 1), (0, 1, 1). The adversary will observe one of the six
distributions, and identify the write sequence as follows:
(2, 0, 0): the write sequence can only be A, A;
(0, 2, 0): the write sequence can only be B, B;
(0, 0, 2): the write sequence can only be C, C;
(1, 1, 0): the write sequence can be either A, B or B, A;
(1, 0, 1): the write sequence can be either A, C or C, A;
(0, 1, 1): the write sequence can be either B, C or C, B.
Thus, P1 = 19×1+ 19×1+ 19×1+ 29× 12 + 29× 12 + 29× 12 =
6
9 =
6
(32)1 .
(2) If the adversary accesses the flash at the end of epoch 2:
The adversary has no knowledge on epoch 1, and can only
guess the write sequence in epoch 1 with probability 19 , as
there are 9 possible write sequences in an epoch. Thus, P2 =
1
9×( 19×1+ 19×1+ 19×1+ 29× 12 + 29× 12 + 29× 12 ) = 692 = 6(32)2 .
(3) If the adversary accesses the flash at the end of epoch j:
Pj =
6
9j =
6
(32)j , in which 6 is the total number of
distributions of epoch counts.
General case:
Let α be the total number of distributions of epoch counts,
e.g., α = 3 for the case “m = 2, c = 2”, and α = 6 for the case
“m = 3, c = 2”. For general values of m and c, Pj = αmcj .
We further quantify α. By distributing c writes to m
blocks, we would like to quantify the total number of possible
distributions. This is actually a stars and bars problem [12].
The answer is
(
m+c−1
m−1
)
, i.e., α =
(
m+c−1
m−1
)
.
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